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DAUGHTERS AND LEFT-WING VOTING
Andrew J. Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee*
Abstract—What determines human beings’ political preferences? Using
nationally representative longitudinal data, we show that having daughters
makes people more likely to vote for left-wing political parties. Having
sons leads people to favor right-wing parties. The paper checks that our
result is not an artifact of family stopping rules, discusses the predictions
from a simple economic model, and tests for possible reverse causality.
1. Introduction
IN remarkable research, the sociologist Rebecca Warnerand the economist Ebonya Washington have shown that
the gender of a person’s children seems to influence the
attitudes and actions of the parent.
Warner (1991) and Warner and Steel (1999) study Amer-
ican and Canadian mothers and fathers.1 The authors’ key
finding is that support for policies designed to address
gender equity is greater among parents with daughters. This
result emerges particularly strongly for fathers. Because
parents invest a significant amount of themselves in their
children, the authors argue, the anticipated and actual strug-
gles that offspring face, and the public policies that tackle
those, matter to those parents. In the words of Warner and
Steel (1999), “Child rearing might provide a mechanism for
social change whereby fathers’ connection with their daugh-
ters undermines . . . patriarchy.” The authors demonstrate
that people who parent only daughters are more likely to
hold feminist views (for example, to favor affirmative ac-
tion). By collecting data on the voting records of U.S.
congresspersons, Washington (2004) is able to go beyond
this. She provides persuasive evidence that congresspersons
with female children tend to vote liberally on reproductive
rights issues such as teen access to contraceptives. In a
revision, Washington (2008) argues for a wider result: that
the congresspersons vote more liberally on a range of issues,
such as flexibility for working families and tax-free educa-
tion. Her data, compiled partly but not wholly from voting
record scores compiled by the three interest groups of the
National Organization for Women, the American Associa-
tion of University Women, and the National Right to Life
Coalition, cover a cross-section of 828 members of four
congresses of the U.S. House of Representatives for the
years 1997 to 2004.2 As her final sentence puts it: “Not only
should we consider the influence that parents have on
children’s behavior, but we should acknowledge that influ-
ence may flow from child to parent” (Washington, 2008).
In this paper, we use nationally representative random
samples of men and women to generalize these results to
voting for entire political parties.3 We document evidence
that having daughters leads people to be more sympathetic
to left-wing parties. Giving birth to sons, by contrast, seems
to make people more likely to vote for a right-wing party.
Our data, which are primarily from Great Britain, are
longitudinal. We also report corroborative results for a
German panel. Access to longitudinal information gives us
the opportunity, one denied to previous researchers, to
observe people both before and after they have a new child
of either gender. We can thereby test for political switching.
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Although panel data cannot resolve every difficulty of
establishing cause-and-effect relationships, they allow
sharper testing than can simple cross-section data.
Following the earlier literature, we think of the gender of
a child arriving in the household as a kind of exogenous
event. Hence, we have the character of an experiment,
where “nature randomly assigns the child gender” (Wash-
ington, 2008). It is then possible to study what happens after
a new child enters a household, and in particular to see
whether girl babies and boy babies have different observ-
able consequences. Consistent with the idea of causality
flowing from the gender of children on to later parental
attitudes, we find that when compared to the year before the
birth, men and women alter their political opinions. Daugh-
ters tilt their parents to the left; sons tilt them to the right.
A difficulty for all analysis of this sort is the possibility of
endogenous family stopping rules. The problem is that
certain kinds of voters may choose to cease having offspring
after they achieve some desired gender mix within their
children, thereby spuriously creating a form of reverse
causality where attitudes determine the gender pattern in the
children. For example, imagine that people with right-
leaning attitudes tend to stop having children after a baby
girl is born, while left-leaning people stop after a baby boy
is born. Then there will emerge a positive association
between right-wingness among parents and statistically dis-
proportionate percentages of sons. The reason is that the
only families with long strings of daughters are the left-
wing parents, and the only families with long strings of sons
are the right-wing parents. Nevertheless, we can solve this
by looking at, say, the gender of the first child who is born.4
Whatever one’s stopping rule as a parent, one starts with
some initial baby, and unlike the later composition of the
family, the gender of that first baby is uncontrollable (given
no selective abortion). Hence we report, later in the paper,
results for firstborns alone.
A lucid overview of much of the research in this field is
provided in Lundberg (2005). The research literature finds,
for example, that the gender of children appears to affect
both labor supply decisions and parents’ attitudes to their
own roles in the family.5 Moreover, female politicians raise
different questions in political debates than men. The inter-
esting recent work by Campbell (2004) documents system-
atic gender differences in modern British political attitudes.
The author tabulates answers given in the 2001 British
Election Survey. She shows that the single most important
concern to males is low taxes. For females, by contrast, it is
the quality of the National Health Service. Norris (2002)
studies the gradual shift to the left of women in Britain’s
politics since World War II. More broadly, our paper is
relevant to the ideas of Benabou and Tirole (2003) on
parental-child interactions, and it fits within work on the
nature of endogenous preferences (see, for instance, Bowles
1998).
Political institutions vary from one nation to another, so
we are not sure how far these results will hold across
countries. However, because of their statistical robustness
and the generality of the issues, we would conjecture that a
version of the same results will be found more widely in
international panel data on voting (such data sets are cur-
rently rare).6
The next section of the paper sets out a (stylized) model
in which it is rational for male and female parents gradually
to alter their voting preferences. Our framework has an
economic flavor. What happens behind the formal analytics
is that because, by assumption, there is pay discrimination
against women and females derive greater utility from
public goods like community safety, it transpires that un-
married women are intrinsically more left wing than unmar-
ried men.7 When compared to males, women prefer a larger
supply of the public good and a greater tax rate on income:
the reason is that their marginal utility from the first is
relatively high and the tax penalty they face from the latter
relatively low. As men acquire female children, however,
those men gradually shift their political stance and become
more sympathetic to the “female” desire for a steeper
income tax schedule and a larger amount of the public good,
so they become more left wing. Similarly, a mother with
many sons becomes sympathetic to the “male” case for
lower taxes and a smaller supply of public goods and
becomes more right wing. In practice, these forces may
operate at a subconscious level. Our paper assumes, follow-
ing the tradition of economic modeling, that people opti-
mize as if they are conscious of deeper motives.
II. Analytical Framework
Assume a world in which people earn real income y and
there is an amount of public good denoted P. The public
good—it might be thought of as the safety of the community
or the quality of the environment—is funded out of tax
revenue. There is a single tax rate, t, levied on personal
income. Assume the political shade of government in this
world can be captured by a single variable, r, the shade of
“red” of this society.8
4 This argument generalizes to the nth child; it does not merely hold
good for the first child.
5 Work on gender in a variety of such settings has been done by Angrist
and Evans (1998), Ben-Porath and Welch (1976), Bird (2005), Butcher
and Case (1994), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Edlund (1999),
Kohler, Behrman, and Skytthe (2005), Lundberg and Rose (2002), Norris
(2004), Morgan, Lye, and Condran (1988), Oswald and Powdthavee
(2008a), and Peresie (2005).
6 In 2007, Andrew Leigh from the Australian National University wrote
to us to say that he had managed to replicate a version of our finding on
Australian microdata: see Leigh (2008).
7 Another case might be that of state pensions and medical care, which,
because females live longer than males, are of natural particular concern
to women.
8 We use red in the historical sense that goes back at least to the era of
Karl Marx, not in the sense used in recent U.S. Democrat and Republican
conventions.
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Assume the existence of a monotonic relationship P(t)
between the supply of the public good and the tax rate. This
is increasing and differentiable; greater income taxes lead to
a larger supply of the public good. Define a left-wing
society, with a high value of r, as one that provides a
relatively large amount of the public good and funds this
with a relatively high tax rate on income. Right-wing
societies, by contrast, have low P and low t. Let the tax rate
be t  t(r), and assume t(r) is increasing, monotonic, and
differentiable. Write the amount of the public good
P  Ptr  pr, (1)
namely, as a reduced-form function of the political shade of
the society.
Consider an unmarried male who has no children. As-
sume he has separable utility function
V  P  y1  t (2)
where the function (P) captures the utility from the public
good, and (.) is differentiable, increasing, and strictly
concave.
In choosing his society’s optimal political color, r, this
male voter balances a desire for low taxes with a desire for
the public good. An unmarried male’s utility maximization
decision is the choice of the level of r that maximizes
V   pr  y1  tr (3)
so that
V
r
  prpr  ytr  0, (4)
after assuming, as will be done throughout this paper, that
the citizen’s maximand V(r) is well behaved.
Now consider an unmarried female voter. In this world, a
childless woman’s utility function is assumed to take the
form
U  1   pr  y1  1  t, (5)
where a nonnegative parameter, , captures any extra rela-
tive weight that females put on the public good P relative to
the males, and another nonnegative parameter, , is the
degree of pay discrimination, if any, within the society.
These seem the relevant characteristics to explore. We later
examine the effects of variations in these. A woman’s
optimal shade of political red is not identical to a man’s.
Hers is given by
U
r
 1 prpr y1 tr 0, (6)
which is usefully written as
 prpr  ytr  	ytr prpr
(7)
and contrasted with the condition in the male equation in
equation (4). This leads to:
Proposition 1. Unmarried women’s voting preferences lie
strictly to the left of unmarried men.
The function U is increasing and concave; the right-hand-
side term of equation (7) is negative; hence the optimal
political shade of red, r*, is higher among females than
males. Other results follow:
Proposition 2.
(i) The greater is their income, y, the less left wing are
unmarried individuals (of either sex).
(ii) The greater is discrimination, the more left wing are
unmarried females.
(iii) The greater is females’ weight on P, the more left-
wing are unmarried females.
Consider income, y. For men, the sign of the cross-partial of
the maximand with respect to r and y is given by the term
	tr 0 (8)
and for women by
	1 tr 0, (9)
which establishes the early part of the proposition. The
others also follow from the cross-partials of equation (5).9
For married people, assume that, where h is a weight less
than unity, when in a couple the maximand of a person is
instead the convex combination
W  h
 pr  y1  tr  1  h (10)
 
1   pr  y1  1  t
in which the values of W will later be denoted for the case
of married men by W  Vm and for married women by W 
Uw. At an optimum, the equivalent to equations (4) and (6)
is
 prpr  ytr  h  1
ytr
  prpr, (11)
where this parameterization imposes the same value of
weight h on men and women. An alternative assumption is
that people put their own utility above that of their spouse.
9 The first-order condition for maximizing J( x, a) is Jx  0. Around
that turning point, Jxxdx  Jxada  0, which can be written simply as
dx/da  	Jxa/Jxx. But Jxx is negative by the second-order condition for
a maximum. Hence the sign of the comparative static result dx/da is
determined solely by the sign of the cross-partial Jxa.
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In such a case, define that weight for males as hm and the
weight for females as hf, with for men hm  hf. As h lies
in the unit interval, the right-hand side of this equation is
greater than that in equation (7) for unmarried women and
smaller than that in equation (4) for unmarried men. As W(.)
is concave:
Proposition 3.
(i) Unmarried women are more left wing than married
people, who in turn are more left wing than unmar-
ried men.
(ii) In the case where hm  hf holds as a strict inequal-
ity, the married women are strictly more left wing
than the married men.
How then might parents be affected by having male and
female offspring? Take a man with f female children and m
male children. One assumption is that he might put some
weight on his own preferences and some weight on the
preferences of his offspring. A strict Darwinian might even
argue that he would be put complete weight on his chil-
dren’s utilities, but that is an extreme. Hence, define an
equivalent to the earlier V function—this time for a married
man with children. Let the preferences of a father be
represented by the new utility function
Vc  Vm  1  
 fU  mV (12)
in which Vm is utility of a married man without children
(which takes a value determined from equation 11), the
assigned weight on own utility is  and that on the chil-
dren’s utility is an assigned weight 1 	 . Here the indi-
vidual acts somewhat like a welfare planner (and if all
weights are 0.5, it is exactly family utilitarianism). For
simplicity, equation (12) imposes a steady state in utilities
and ignores discounting. Male children are assigned within
their male parent’s maximand the same utility function as
that of childless males, V, and female children are assigned
the utility function of childless females, U. This might seem
myopic, because parents may bear in mind that their own
children will reproduce, but such extra terms eventually
disappear algebraically.
Put more intuitively, a father takes on some of the
preferences of his female offspring. For their sake, if only
subconsciously, he begins to vote accordingly. The optimal
political shade of the father is given by
Vc
r
 
Vm
r
 1  m
V
r
 1   f U
r
 0,
(13)
where, as before, we are concentrating on the case of
interior optima. Under these assumptions:
Proposition 4. The more daughters a person has, the
more he or she votes to the left. The more sons the person
has, the more he or she votes to the right.
As the number of daughters, f, rises, the optimal political
shade of red of this individual, r*, also increases. The sign
of dr*/df is given by the sign of the partial derivative of
equation (13) with respect to female children, f. That cross-
partial’s sign is determined solely by
1  
U
r
. (14)
Unmarried women are the most left wing of the four groups.
Hence around the r*, that is optimal for married men, the
derivative U/r is strictly positive. Similar results apply
for females; the algebra is omitted.
This framework is a deliberately simple one. It is not
designed to explain details of the political world. Our aim
instead is to try to contribute to thinking about possible
sources of gender differences—to allow us to say something
about averages within a population.
III. Empirical Testing
The paper proposes an empirical exploration of these
ideas. The main source used in the analysis is the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a nationally rep-
resentative random sample of British households, contain-
ing over 10,000 adult individuals, conducted between Sep-
tember and Christmas of each year from 1991 (see Taylor et
al., 2002). Respondents are interviewed in successive
waves; households that move to a new residence are inter-
viewed at their new location; if an individual splits off from
the original household, the adult members of the new
household are also interviewed. Children are interviewed
once they reach 11 years old. The sample has remained
representative of the British population since the early
1990s. Numbers of adult children are not recorded fully in
the data set, so this paper focuses on offspring who live at
home. Relatively little research appears to have been done
on political preferences in BHPS data. Some exceptions are
Sanders and Brynin (1999) and the work of Johnston, Jones,
et al. (2005) and Johnston, Sarker, et al. (2005), but these do
not explore the influence of children on their parents’
politics.
A chief focus here is on which political party an individ-
ual supports. The exact question used (AV8 in the survey) is
as follows, with, for illustration, British people’s mean
answers given for the year 1991: “Which party do you
regard yourself as being closer to than the others?”
Conservative (3,110 individuals, 46.3%)
Labour (2,707 individuals, 40.3%)
Liberal Democrats (698 individuals, 10.4%)
Scottish National Party (91 individuals, 1.4%)
Plaid Cymru (7 individuals, 0.1%)
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Green Party (76 individuals, 1.1%)
Other parties (22 individuals, 0.3%)
Other answer (7 individuals, 0.1%)
Don’t know/no answer (3,546 individuals)
In the later analysis, we measure “left wing” by using
individuals’ expressed support for the Labour Party or
Liberal Democrat Party. We measure “right wing” by using
expressed support for the Conservative Party. Because they
are hard to classify on a political left-right scale and num-
bers are small, individual voters for other political parties
are eventually eliminated from the data set. Clearly it is not
possible in this way, or any simple way, to do justice to the
complexities of human beings’political preferences. A trade-
off exists between tractability and generality. Nevertheless,
there is agreement that Labour is to the left (it has tradi-
tionally promoted socialist ideas) and the Conservatives are
to the right (it has promoted the free market). The Liberal
Democrats are more centrist, and thus in between the two
larger parties, but have often been seen as closer to the left
than the right. The Labour and Liberal Democrats are
combined only for simplicity; the results of our paper do not
rest on such an aggregation. Later analysis will not distin-
guish between whether the individual survey respondent is
literally happier when his or her political party is in power,
though it is natural to assume so (and Di Tella & MacCul-
loch, 2005, find evidence for that in Western Europe). It is
clear from these data, moreover, that many voters say they
are undecided. We assume in the paper that this is inevitable
in empirical work on political preference and, for simplicity,
later generally leave aside these observations.
Before we move to a formal analysis of the data set, it is
natural to mention the political complexion of current fe-
male members of Parliament in Great Britain. At the time of
writing, there are 127 women in the House of Commons, the
main legislative body. Of those, 17 are Conservative. More
than 100 of the women are Labour or Liberal Democrat.
Such a highly unequal division between right wing and left
wing among female politicians contrasts with an approxi-
mately equal split among male politicians. This fact sug-
gests some kind of connection between gender and political
beliefs.
While the theoretical model may apply generally, this
paper will be silent empirically on a large range of nations.
Women in the United States, for instance, are known to be
more pro-Democrat in general than men, and this tendency
has grown over the past few decades (Edlund & Pande,
2002; Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, & Lin 2004). Greenberg
(1998) concludes: “There is no question that, in general,
women are more likely than men to favor activist govern-
ment, the sort of agenda traditionally associated with the
Democratic Party.” Nevertheless, it is not clear how, for
example, the principles of Britain’s Labour Party should be
viewed relative to those of the U.S. Democratic Party. In
modern data, Inglehart and Norris (1999) find some evi-
dence of a more widespread female tendency to vote left in
other countries (although in older data, this was less com-
mon). Further research will be needed to compare the
paper’s patterns with non-British ones. Moreover, the paper
is unable to say how long-standing the patterns in the data
have been; it is known that in the 1950s, both British and
American females were more right wing than they are today,
and it is not easy to speculate on any role for child gender
during that era. Here our analysis’s contribution is inevita-
bly weak.
In this British data set, which spans the years 1991 to
2005, we examine the voting intentions of adults. There are
approximately 80,000 observations on political party pref-
erences. These are longitudinal data (this is an unbalanced
panel), and there is much stability, year-on-year, in a per-
son’s political views. Approximately two-thirds of people in
this sample express a preference for the left, in our termi-
nology, which we take as synonymous with either Labour or
Liberal Democrat. In the raw data, the split between men
and women is similar (approximately two-thirds of the
population being left leaning), although this makes no
allowance for different ages or cohort effects. As we shall
see later, unmarried men vote to the right and unmarried
women to the left.
Means and standard deviations for the raw BHPS data are
provided in the appendix. The mean number of children in
a household is 0.70, with a standard deviation of 1.02.
Approximately 3% of the sample (the denominator here
includes people out of the labor force) say they are unem-
ployed; 7% are self-employed; 7% look after the home;
25% are retired; 47% are males; 59% are married; 9% are
widowed; 10% have as their highest qualification a univer-
sity bachelor’s degree, while 2% have a master’s or doctor-
ate. Mean age is 48 years old. These personal characteristics
are viewed here as additional influences beyond the gender
effect studied in the earlier section’s formal model.
As suggested by the theoretical framework, we ask
whether the gender of a person’s children makes a differ-
ence to that individual’s political preferences. Because the
sex of babies is random, the gender mix of the family might
potentially be viewed as exogenous. But such an argument
is not quite complete. Family size is chosen. Some families
will for personal and cultural reasons have different “stop-
ping rules” (perhaps go-on-until-a-boy-is-born-and-then-
stop, and so on). Nevertheless, the individual gender of a
child is approximately out of a parent’s control. One feasible
exception is that in principle, some babies might be aborted
because of their sex, as measured by a scan in the womb.
However, abortion is legal in Britain only where the moth-
er’s physical or mental health is at stake. A referee has
pointed out that there is some chance women pregnant with
a child of the “wrong” sex would calculatingly declare that
they cannot handle another baby and seek an abortion; so if
right-wing parents aborted daughters disproportionately,
then we would get signs of our later pattern. However, there
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are two objections to this interpretation. First, it is perhaps
not easy to believe that such an activity (if discovered, the
doctors would be struck off—banned for life—for taking
part in it) could go on at the large level required to generate
the strong daughters–left-voting correlation that we observe
in the data. Second, and more important, it is hard to see
how it could be an explanation longitudinally for the key
correlation. Because we see our effect in panel data, not just
in cross-sections, the selective-abortion thesis would require
that for some reason, a switch to the left among parents
preceded the selected birth of a female.
The paper’s emphasis is on the correlation between the
gender composition of offspring and the voting preferences
of parents. In the formal analysis, we generally combine
natural children and any stepchildren of the head of the
household (that is, other stepchildren are omitted). But we
check what happens when the types are separated.
Figure 1 gives a first flavor of the result. Its columns
show, for randomly selected British voters, that left-wing
voters have systematically higher proportions of female
children. Among families with two children, the mean
number of daughters among left voters exceeds the mean
number of sons; the same is true for people with three
children; and the same holds among those with four chil-
dren. Figure 1 includes children who are on the household
roster (so those children who are dependents aged 0 to 15
and children who are over 15 but remain at home). It does
not count children who have left the household. When, as a
check, the sample is restricted solely to those aged under 16,
in figure 2, the same pattern emerges. Because size of
family is endogenous and is likely to be correlated with
people’s characteristics and innate preferences, the compar-
isons here are deliberately across groups with equal num-
bers of offspring. This result should nonetheless be treated
cautiously. Once the standard errors are adjusted for clus-
tering, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that, for
any number of children c, the number of daughters equals
the number of sons for supporters of each political wing.
Even so, such a test throws away statistical information
because it does not pool the findings from all six columns in,
for example, figure 2. We return later to other tests of
statistical significance. Figure 3 switches to a graph in
which political preference is on the y-axis. The comparison
in this case is between people with only three sons and those
with only three daughters. Of those with sons, 66% vote for
the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrat Party. Among
FIGURE 1.—PROPORTION OF DAUGHTERS AND VOTING PREFERENCES IN
GREAT BRITAIN, 1991–2004
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Note: There were 3,859 (7,453) observations preferring Conservative (Labour/Liberal Democrats
[Lib/Dems]) over other parties with two children; 1,171 (2,534) observations preferring Conservatives
(Labour/Lib Dems) with three children; and 217 (601) observations preferring Conservatives (Labour/
Lib Dems) with four children. The t-test statistics ( p-value) of whether the mean number of daughters
between the two groups is equal are 	2.535 [0.000] (N of children  2), 	3.999 [0.000] (N of
children  3), and 	2.577 [0.000] (N of children  4). The adjusted t-test statistics ( p-value) for
clustering by personal identification of whether the mean number of daughters between the two groups
is equal are 	0.822 [0.411] (N of children  2), 	1.354 [0.176] (N of children  3), and 	0.844 [0.377]
(N of children  4).
FIGURE 2.—PROPORTION OF DAUGHTERS (AGED UNDER 16) AND VOTING
PREFERENCES IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1991–2004
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Note: There were 2,581 (5,233) observations preferring Conservative (Labour/Lib Dems) over other
parties with two children aged under 16; 778 (1,682) observations preferring Conservatives (Labour/Lib
Dems) with three children aged under 16; and 115 (376) observations preferring Conservatives
(Labour/Lib Dems) with four children aged under 16. The t-test statistics ( p-value) of whether the mean
number of daughters aged under 16 between the two groups is equal are 	2.199 [0.000] (N of children 
2), 	1.914 [0.056] (N of children  3), and 	3.293 [0.000] (N of children  4). The adjusted t-test
statistics [ p-value] for clustering by personal identification of whether the mean number of daughters
between the two groups is equal are 	0.980 [0.164] (N of children  2), 	0.924 [0.356] (N of
children  3), and 	1.687 [0.097] (N of children  4).
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those with daughters, 76% vote Labour or Liberal Demo-
crat.
The advantage of longitudinal data is that we can exam-
ine the interesting case of political switchers. The remaining
figures (from figure 4 onward) measure on the y-axis the
size of the leftward move. As people have their daughters
and sons, we can observe what happens. In the third column
of figure 4, those who have an additional daughter—there
are approximately 1,000 such households—shift during that
year disproportionately to the left. The y-axis of figure 4
gives the proportion of changes in the voting preference
from t 	 1 to t. Define a value of 0  no change in the
voting preference. If it takes a value of 	1, then it means
the person voted for Labour/Liberal Democrat at t 	 1 and
then switched to Conservative at t, and vice versa for the
value of 1 (switching from Conservative at t 	 1 to
Labour/Liberal Democrat at t). Because most people did not
alter their vote, the means of the number of daughters here
are quite small. Hence in the figures we multiply the
numbers by 100.
The effect captured in figure 4 is suggestive but not
statistically different from 0 at the 5% level. Sharper evi-
dence is provided in figure 5. Plotted on the horizontal axis
is the net growth, within the year, of daughters relative to
sons. There are 1,883 observations on households with a
negative net change in daughters and 1,924 with a positive
net change. As is clear visually from figure 5, there is a
strong association between having daughters and moving
leftward politically. In this case, the effect is significant at
the 1% level.
Family structure is not exogenous. Arguably, therefore, a
good experiment stems from the impact of the gender of,
say, a firstborn child; this test is not subject to bias from
family stopping rules. Thus firstborn children are studied in
figure 6. Once again, acquiring a daughter is associated with
people turning toward the Labour and Liberal Democratic
parties, and having a son with parents tilting instead to the
Conservative party. The size of the effect is approximately
the same as earlier.
FIGURE 3.—PROPORTION OF PEOPLE SUPPORTING PARTIES BY THE GENDER
OF THEIR CHILDREN
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Note: There were 503 observations with three sons and no daughters and 473 observations with three
daughters and no sons. The t-test statistics ( p-value) of whether the proportion of people supporting
either Labour or Liberal Democrats between the two groups is equal is 	3.035 [0.002]. The adjusted
t-test statistics ( p-value) for clustering by personal identification of whether the proportion of people
supporting either Labour or Liberal Democrats between the two groups is equal is 	1.531 [0.127].
FIGURE 4.—PROPORTION OF PEOPLE SWITCHING POLITICAL PARTY
AFFILIATION AND CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF DAUGHTERS
FROM T TO T  1
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Note: There were 993 observations with at least one daughter leaving the household roster between T
and T  1 (net change  	1), 45,214 observations with no change in the number of daughters, and 967
observations with at least one additional daughter in the household roster (net change  1). The
adjusted t-test statistics ( p-value) for clustering by personal identification of whether the average change
in the voting preference between the two groups (	1 and 1) is the same is 	1.078 [0.281].
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Figure 7 sets out an equivalent finding for Germany. Here
the data source is the German Socioeconomic Panel, a larger
panel than the British BHPS data set. Switching toward the
left (detailed definitions are given later) is once again
disproportionately preceded by having a daughter, and the
reverse for the arrival of a son.
To control for confounding influences, BHPS regression
equation evidence is set out in table 1. This begins, in its
first three columns, with elementary logit equations in
which the dependent variable is a binary variable to capture
voting left. The key independent variable is the number of
daughters. Here we follow the empirical strategy in the
work of Washington (2004): the specification allows the
effect of pure family size to be held constant. When the number
of children is controlled for, the coefficient on the number of
daughters tells us about the proportional influence of the
gender composition of offspring. Column 1 of table 1, in
which only basic demographic variables are held constant,
estimates the coefficient on the number of daughters at
0.100 with a standard error of 0.044. There is also an effect
on left-wing voting from the age variable: older people vote
to the right. Regional dummies also have strong effects (but
are not reported explicitly). The poorer north of Great
Britain is known to be more supportive of left-wing parties.
“Wave dummies” here are year dummies for each wave of
the BHPS surveys.
Column 2 of table 1 incorporates a list of extra variables:
controls for marital status, income, education, employment
type, and other personal characteristics. As before, there
remains a positive link, with a coefficient of almost the same
size, between having daughters and voting for the Labour
and Liberal Democrats.
To check the theoretical framework’s ideas, column 3 of
table 1 introduces separate dummy variables for married
male, married female, and single female. The omitted cat-
FIGURE 5.—POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION SWITCHING AND CHANGE IN THE
NUMBER OF DAUGHTERS OVER THE NUMBER OF SONS FROM T TO T  1
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Note: There were 1,883 observations with a negative net change in the number of daughters over the
number of sons between T and T  1, 43,259 observations with no change in the number of daughters
relative to the number of sons, and 1,924 observations with a positive net change in the number of
daughters over the number of sons between T and T  1. The adjusted t-test statistics ( p-value) for
clustering by personal identification of whether the average change in the voting preference between the
two groups (	1 and 1) is the same is 	2.649 [0.008].
FIGURE 6.—POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION SWITCHING AND THE GENDER
OF THE FIRSTBORN
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Note: The sample is restricted to those with a firstborn at T. There are 825 sons and 804 daughters born
during the BHPS sample. The adjusted t-test statistics ( p-value) for clustering by personal identification
of whether the average change in the voting preference between the two groups (	1 and 1) is the same
is 	2.473 [0.014].
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egory here is for unmarried males. Consistent with the
analysis predictions, the coefficients on the three categories
rise monotonically: the numbers are 0.030, 0.146, and
0.275**. This makes it possible to conclude, at the 5% level,
that single women are further to the left than single men.
The difference is fairly large, at approximately half the
ceteris paribus cross-sectional effect of having a university
degree.
Consistent with the theoretical model in the earlier part of
the paper, the results of columns 2 and 3 of table 1 find that
high-income people lean rightward. Highly educated people
tend to be left wing; self-employed individuals tend to be
(strongly) right wing. Interestingly, mental strain, as cap-
tured by the commonly used GHQ score, enters positively in
this left-wing voting probability equation, as do widowed,
divorced, and disabled. The construction of GHQ scores, a
measure that amalgamates answers to twelve psychiatric
strain questions, is described in Oswald and Powdthavee
(2008b). As would be expected, other independent variables
enter the political-preference equations (Alesina & La Fer-
rara, 2005, discuss the micro-determinants of taste for
redistribution), but the paper does not explore these in
detail. Many of the variables in our equations are likely to
be endogenously determined, but it seems useful to observe
that the daughters’ effect survives their inclusion.
The last three columns of table 1 turn to fixed-effect logit
estimates (denoted L-FE in the table). This has methodolog-
ical advantages over the related work on cross-section data
by Rebecca Warner and Ebonya Washington. For well-
understood reasons, there may be omitted variables that are
correlated with both voting preferences and the nature of
people’s families. Hence there is a case for using an esti-
mator that can difference out the unobservable personal
characteristics. Although the usual criticisms of non–fixed
effects estimation are possibly less powerful in this setting
(because the gender mix of the children is somewhat diffi-
cult for parents to control), it is natural to explore the
structure of a fixed-effects voting equation.
Now, in column 4 of table 1, the coefficient on the
daughters’ variable is 0.363, with a standard error of 0.141.
The coefficient is similar in columns 5 and 6, which separate
into subsamples for mothers’ and fathers’ voting. The stan-
dard errors now weaken a little. It is not possible to reject
the null hypothesis that 0.383 is equal to 0.343. Hence, the
influence of child gender appears to be similar for male
parents and female parents.
At the suggestion of a referee, table 2 turns to specifica-
tions in which natural daughters (those born biologically to
the parent) and step-, foster, or adopted daughters are
separated into two groups. The bulk of the daughters effect
appears to come through the coefficient on natural daugh-
ters.
Table 3 now breaks the longitudinal data into daughters
and sons “entering” and “leaving” the parental household.
Although, perhaps inevitably, standard errors are not always
small, the clearest effects come from children when they
enter. In the third column of table 3, the coefficient on more
daughters is 0.333, and that on more sons is 	0.378; in each
case, the null of 0 cannot quite be rejected at the 5% level
(though equality of coefficients can). Some of the other
coefficients move around and are poorly defined.
Table 4 checks that the paper’s correlation is not being
produced by reverse causality. We examine people’s voting
preferences before they have a child. Being left wing in time
t 	 1 is not predictive within this equation of having a
daughter in period t. Table 5 also checks that the main result
is not produced by some unusual interaction with income. A
test of the case of firstborns is also done. Table 6 demon-
strates, though the size of the effective sample is inevitably
reduced and the standard errors worsened, that the same
tenor of results is found among parents of firstborn children.
FIGURE 7.—PROPORTION OF PEOPLE SWITCHING POLITICAL PARTY
AFFILIATION AND CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF DAUGHTERS FROM
T TO T  1: GERMAN SOCIOECONOMIC PANEL DATA, 1985–2002
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Note: There were 871 observations with at least one daughter leaving the household roster between T
and T  1 (net change  	1), 46,928 observations with no change in the number of daughters, and 651
observations with at least one additional daughter in the household roster (net change  1). The
adjusted t-test statistics ( p-value) for clustering by personal identification of whether the average change
in the voting preference between the two groups (	1 and 1) is the same is 	2.713 [0.007].
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TABLE 1.—EQUATIONS FOR THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR A LEFT-WING PARTY AT TIME T: LOGITS AND FIXED EFFECT LOGITS, BHPS, 1991–2005
Vote Left Wing at t
Logit Logit Logit L-FE L-FE L-FE
All All All All Female Male
Number of all
daughters
0.100** 0.093** 0.093** 0.363** 0.383* 0.343*
(0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.141) (0.210) (0.199)
Number of all children
1 0.051 	0.047 	0.053 	0.369** 	0.308 	0.393*
(0.048) (0.057) (0.057) (0.153) (0.215) (0.224)
2 	0.048 	0.230*** 	0.237*** 	0.432* 	0.169 0.697**
(0.048) (0.082) (0.082) (0.233) (0.331) (0.344)
3 	0.041 0.228* 0.237* 	0.109 0.297 	0.555
(0.103) (0.125) (0.125) (0.347) (0.517) (0.485)
4 0.313* 	0.025 	0.038 0.318 0.900 	0.108
(0.187) (0.219) (0.219) (0.613) (0.954) (0.857)
5 0.230 	0.106 	0.122 	0.858 	1.630 	0.625
(0.318) (0.368) (0.368) (0.868) (1.341) (1.297)
6 0.145 	0.174 	0.192 	0.699 11.671 	2.239
(0.553) (0.646) (0.646) (1.290) (366.953) (1.658)
Married 	0.044 0.212 0.278 0.350
(0.069) (0.210) (0.317) (0.295)
Married male 0.030
(0.086)
Married female 0.146
(0.111)
Single female 0.275**
(0.111)
Cohabited 0.086 0.215** 0.134 0.230 0.187
(0.070) (0.090) (0.182) (0.287) (0.247)
Widowed 0.174* 0.344*** 0.409 0.187 1.102**
(0.102) (0.123) (0.322) (0.438) (0.549)
Divorced 0.258** 0.405*** 0.338 0.504 0.245
(0.106) (0.122) (0.286) (0.425) (0.406)
Separated 0.068 0.212 0.020 0.175 	0.049
(0.137) (0.148) (0.327) (0.483) (0.461)
Male 	0.0217 	0.010 0.106
(0.040) (0.043) (0.077)
Age 	0.015** 0.014* 0.014*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2/100 0.004 	0.023*** 	0.023*** 	0.030 	0.026 	0.029
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.034) (0.038)
Roman Catholic 0.157** 0.158** 0.036 	0.024 0.129
(0.077) (0.077) (0.221) (0.299) (0.335)
Church of England 	0.575*** 	0.574*** 	0.032 0.009 	0.125
(0.047) (0.047) (0.119) (0.169) (0.172)
Other religion 	0.332*** 	0.332*** 	0.103 	0.071 	0.164
(0.062) (0.062) (0.172) (0.239) (0.255)
Income (in £1,000) 	0.039*** 	0.039*** 0.007 0.004 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Household size 0.033 0.035* 	0.052 	0.065 	0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.057) (0.087) (0.078)
First degree 0.466*** 0.467*** 	0.161 	0.238 	0.188
(0.073) (0.073) (0.258) (0.355) (0.387)
Higher degree 0.794*** 0.794*** 0.279 0.086 0.435
(0.154) (0.154) (0.486) (0.763) (0.659)
Self-employed 	0.725*** 	0.728*** 0.034 0.158 	0.089
(0.069) (0.069) (0.161) (0.283) (0.199)
Unemployed 0.367*** 0.367*** 	0.262 	0.115 	0.446*
(0.074) (0.074) (0.200) (0.317) (0.267)
Retired 	0.041 	0.041 	0.157 0.138 0.574**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.148) (0.202) (0.227)
Maternity leave 0.266* 0.274* 0.085 0.174
(0.146) (0.146) (0.406) (0.415)
Family care 	0.014 	0.009 0.118 0.170 1.543*
(0.064) (0.064) (0.150) (0.165) (0.903)
Full-time student 	0.049 	0.056 0.318 0.517* 0.156
(0.073) (0.073) (0.206) (0.305) (0.297)
Disabled 0.475*** 0.478*** 	0.613** 	0.647* 	0.849**
(0.103) (0.103) (0.252) (0.380) (0.349)
Government training
scheme
0.487* 0.495* 	0.498 1.339 	1.482**
(0.250) (0.250) (0.560) (0.861) (0.726)
Other 	0.050 	0.050 0.304 0.618 	0.447
(0.184) (0.184) (0.453) (0.560) (0.835)
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The emphasis so far in the paper has been on whether
the null hypothesis of 0 can be rejected. How large, and
therefore how significant for social science, are the ef-
fects from child gender on parental voting? The most
persuasive estimates are arguably likely those in logits
with fixed effects. Results for other estimators (equations
available upon request) are given below as a contrast. For
each daughter, holding family size constant, a parent is
approximately 2 percentage points more likely to vote
left as follows:
Calculated Size of the Effect from Each Extra Daughter
(Percentage Increase in the Likelihood of Voting Left)
Logit with random effects: 1.8 percentage probability
points
OLS with fixed effects: 1.4 percentage probability points
Logit with fixed effects: 2.7 percentage probability points
TABLE 1.—(CONTINUED)
Vote Left Wing at t
Logit Logit Logit L-FE L-FE L-FE
All All All All Female Male
Mental distress (GHQ-12) 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031** 0.043**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019)
Constant 0.872*** 0.940***
(0.236) (0.249)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood 	56,863.63 	49,436.37 	49,422.74 	3,443.891 	1,784.184 	1,621.478
N 93,044 84,440 84,440 10,826 5,798 5,028
Note: The first three columns are pooled cross-section logits; they allow for clustering within person. The second set of three columns, headed L-FE, is fixed-effect logits. Reference groups: no stated religion,
lower than first-degree education, employed full time, never married (and single male in the second column). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: British Household Panel Study.
TABLE 2.—EQUATIONS FOR THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR A LEFT-WING
PARTY AT TIME t: VARIABLES FOR TYPE OF CHILDREN, BHPS 1991–2005
Vote Left Wing at t
L-FE L-FE L-FE
All Female Male
Number of natural
daughters
0.409*** 0.387* 0.451*
(0.147) (0.213) (0.216
Number of step/foster/
adopted daughters
	0.181 	0.799 	0.076
(0.506) (1.589) (0.552)
Number of natural
children
1 	0.355** 	0.283 	0.390*
(0.155) (0.217) (0.229)
2 	0.550** 	0.191 	0.990***
(0.239) (0.333) (0.362)
3 	0.014 0.313 	0.457
(0.365) (0.522) (0.533)
4 0.462 0.906 	0.001
(0.653) (0.955) (0.970)
5 	0.661 	2.268 	0.645
(0.943) (1.674) (1.355)
6 	0.564 12.715 	2.249
(1.325) (642.753) (1.699)
Number of step/foster/
adopted children
1 0.071 0.789 	0.16
(0.408) (1.281) (0.463)
2 0.58 	10.226 0.324
(0.677) (2370.390) (0.723)
3 0.805 — 0.629
(1.278) (1.320)
Log likelihood 	3,440.254 	1,783.632 	1,617.632
N 10,827 5,799 5,028
Note: Same controls as in table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. In the first row, it is not possible
to reject at 5% the null hypothesis that coefficient 0.387 is equal to 0.451.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: BHPS.
TABLE 3.—EQUATIONS FOR THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR A LEFT-WING
PARTY AT TIME t: VARIABLES FOR CHILDREN LEAVING AND ENTERING THE
HOUSEHOLD, BHPS 1991–2005
Vote Left Wing at t
L-FE L-FE L-FE
All All All
Fewer daughters from t 	 1 0.172 0.233
(0.213) (0.216)
More daughters from t 	 1 0.392* 0.333*
(0.186) (0.190)
Fewer sons from t 	 1 0.110 0.076
(0.207) (0.210)
More sons from t 	 1 	0.398* 	0.378*
(0.190) (0.194)
Number of all children at t 	 1 0.174* 0.086 0.104
(0.078) (0.077) (0.089)
Log likelihood 	3,276.670 	3,276.975 	3,274.717
N 10,294 10,294 10,294
Note: Same controls as in table 1. Reference groups: no change in the number of natural children from
t 	 1, no change in the number of natural daughter from t 	 1. Variables such as fewer daughters
include grown-up daughters leaving the home and daughter deaths and any other reason (we do not know
the exact reasons). Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: BHPS.
TABLE 4.—CHECKING FOR THE EFFECTS OF LEFT-WING VOTING AT T 	 1 ON
THE PROBABILITY OF HAVING A FIRST DAUGHTER (LOGIT)
First Daughter All
Vote Left Wing at t 	 1 	0.099
(0.164)
Personal controls Yes
Regional dummies Yes
Wave dummies Yes
Log likelihood 	539.5585
N 830
Note: Dependent variable: First daughter  1, first son  0. Standard errors are in parentheses. Sample
contains only individuals with their first daughter (no record of other children—sons or daughters—in the
household).
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: BHPS.
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The numbers in the case of firstborn children, as in table 6,
are similar in size, at slightly more than 2 percentage points
per daughter.
It seems interesting to go a little further. In the spirit of
the research literature described earlier, and especially
Washington (2004), we can ask empirically whether other
attitudes are altered by having daughters rather than sons.
Table 7 is an attempt to shed light on this. It uses answers
to various attitudinal questions from the panel; these are
coded on a 5-point scale so that, for simplicity here, cardi-
nality is assumed. Each of the four columns in table 7 is a
GLS regression equation, with a different dependent vari-
able each time. The number of daughters enters negatively
in a “Cohabitation is not all right” equation; positively in a
“Homosexuality is not wrong” equation, although in this
instance the standard error is not well determined; positively
in a “It is not true that a husband should earn while the wife
stays at home” equation; and positively in a “It is not true
that children need a father as much as mother” equation.
Following the questions discussed in Johnston and Pattie
(2000), it would be possible to look more deeply into
attitudinal issues, but we have not done so in this paper.
There are no questions in the British Household Panel
survey on the area of life covered particularly by the work
of Washington (2004), namely, that of people’s attitudes
toward women’s issues such as abortion, but, like her, we
find here that the gender mix of children is correlated with
parents’ social attitudes toward family matters.
A number of robustness checks, some suggested by sem-
inar participants in presentations of the paper, were under-
taken. By using a set of dummy variables, we have found
that the influence of the number of daughters seems to be
monotonic up to around five children (where, because of the
rarity in modern data of large families, the size of sample
TABLE 5.—TESTING FOR INTERACTION EFFECTS BETWEEN DAUGHTERS
AND INCOME
Vote Left Wing at t
Logit L-FE
All All
Number of all daughters 0.220*** 0.494***
(0.063) (0.164)
Income (in £1,000) 	0.036*** 0.009*
(0.003) (0.005)
Number of daughters  Income 	0.017*** 	0.016
(0.006) (0.010)
Number of all children
1 	0.029 	0.350**
(0.057) (0.153)
2 	0.222*** 	0.429*
(0.083) (0.233)
3 	0.259** 	0.153
(0.126) (0.348)
4 	0.124 0.18
(0.223) (0.620)
5 	0.203 	1.051
(0.379) (0.875)
6 	0.414 	0.953
(0.658) (1.304)
Log likelihood 	49,415.17 	3,442.684
N 84,440 10,826
Note: Same controls as in table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: BPHS.
TABLE 6.—LEFT-WING VOTING EQUATIONS AND THE FIRSTBORN
Vote Left Wing at t
L-FE L-FE
All All
Firstborn daughter 0.191 —
(0.341)
Firstborn son
— 	0.292
(0.319)
Log likelihood 	2,553.213 	2,552.951
N 7,904 7,904
Note: Same controls as in table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: BHPS.
TABLE 7.—ATTITUDES REGRESSIONS (RANDOM EFFECTS)
Cohabiting Is Not All Right Homosexuality Is Not Wrong
Not True That: Husband Should
Earn, Wife Should Stay at Home
Not True That: Children Need Father
as Much as Mother
All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male
Number of all
daughters
	0.020* 	0.014 	0.026 0.016 0.007 0.025 0.027*** 0.013 0.040*** 0.020** 0.019 0.016
(0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of all
children
1 	0.033** 	0.035* 	0.025 0.013 	0.023 0.031 	0.031** 	0.045*** 	0.036* 0.063*** 0.114*** 	0.042***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.026) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
2 	0.051*** 	0.063** 	0.026 0.030 	0.017 0.051 	0.063*** 	0.073*** 	0.081*** 0.063*** 0.132*** 	0.070***
(0.020) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030) (0.038) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
3 	0.045 	0.057 	0.015 0.056 0.019 0.050 	0.091*** 	0.090** 	0.127*** 0.064*** 0.123*** 	0.056*
(0.029) (0.039) (0.044) (0.035) (0.045) (0.056) (0.027) (0.035) (0.041) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031)
4 0.020 0.013 0.045 0.090 0.000 0.157* 	0.231*** 	0.230*** 	0.280*** 0.055 0.132*** 	0.093*
(0.046) (0.061) (0.070) (0.056) (0.070) (0.090) (0.042) (0.056) (0.065) (0.036) (0.051) (0.050)
5 	0.075 	0.093 	0.038 0.126 0.021 0.200 	0.312*** 	0.316*** 	0.374*** 	0.013 0.045 	0.142*
(0.076) (0.100) (0.116) (0.092) (0.115) (0.149) (0.072) (0.095) (0.111) (0.062) (0.088) (0.086)
6 0.235** 0.357** 0.066 	0.389*** 	0.270 	0.676*** 	0.560*** 	0.596*** 	0.656*** 	0.096 	0.061 	0.211*
(0.119) (0.155) (0.187) (0.145) (01.79) (0.239) (0.104) (0.141) (0.154) (0.091) (0.132) (0.122)
R2 (within) 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.003
N 53,599 29,212 24,390 53,419 29,098 24,324 74,694 40,588 34,108 74,715 40,607 34,110
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Responses are coded: 1  strongly agree to 5  strongly disagree. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: BHPS.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS224
becomes small). This issue seems important but demands a
larger data set if it is to be examined truly persuasively.
Splitting the number-of-daughters variable into two age
classes does not alter the main conclusion. Once again, it
seems likely that a larger data set would be needed if the aim
is to find out whether it is young children, rather than older
children, who are disproportionately responsible for the
shaping of political attitudes.
As a further check on reverse causality, we tested
extensively for signs of the Trivers-Willard hypothesis
(1973). This is the idea that causality might flow from
parental characteristics or the environment on to the
gender of babies being born: “In species with a long
period of parental investment after birth of young, one
might expect biases in parental behavior toward offspring
of different sex, according to the parental condition;
parents in better condition would be expected to show a
bias toward male offspring” (p. 90). This is related to
Bateman’s principle (1948) that females invest more in
offspring and therefore become the scarce resource that
are competed over by males. In interesting work, Ka-
nazawa and Vandermassen (2005) have recently proposed
a generalized version of the Trivers-Willard hypothesis,
which they call gTWH. Nevertheless, whatever we do, in
these data a person’s voting color in time t does not seem
to be predictive of a new child’s gender in t  1. Insofar
as we can tell, causality is running from the gender of the
child, not toward it.
Table 8, as a further check, changes to the German
Socioeconomic Panel. It suggests a similar pattern. The
key coefficient, in the first column of table 8, is 0.383,
with a standard error of 0.105. However, breaking the
sample into female and male parents shows in the second
column of table 8 that the coefficient on daughters is very
poorly determined in the sample of women voters. We are
not sure how to interpret this. Nevertheless, using longi-
tudinal data from 1984 to 2003, which here provides a
sample of approximately 16,000 Germans’ recorded po-
litical preferences, in the full sample, we find quite strong
corroborative evidence for the earlier result on the British
data. We measure left-wing political preferences here as
expressed support for a combination of Social Demo-
cratic Party and Free Democratic Party. The alternatives,
the right wing in this classification, are the combined
Christian Union and Christian Democrat parties. Other,
and alternative, specifications are provided in Oswald
and Powdthavee (2005b). Further discussion of the Ger-
man case, and associated regression equations, is avail-
able on request. Earlier online versions of our work, with
a wider range of specifications and other checks, are
reported in Oswald and Powdthavee (2005a, 2006).
IV. Conclusion
This paper explores the roots of political preference.
Our work builds on, and attempts to generalize, innova-
tive research by Rebecca Warner on children’s influence
on parents’ views on feminist issues and affirmative
action and by Ebonya Washington on children’s influence
on congresspersons’ views on issues such as reproductive
rights.
The paper finds evidence that having daughters makes
people more sympathetic to left-wing parties. Acquiring
sons, by contrast, makes individuals more right wing.
Ceteris paribus, in our panel data, every extra daughter
(or son) leads a person to be approximately 2 percentage
points more likely to vote left (or right). Our data come
principally from Great Britain, but we show that the basic
result can be replicated for German microdata. The
checks described in the paper suggest that the result
seems not to be an artifact of family stopping rules, or of
TABLE 8.—CHECKING THE VOTING RESULT ON GERMAN DATA, 1984–2003:
FIXED EFFECT LOGITS
Vote Left Wing at t All Female Male
Number of daughters 0.383*** 	0.141 0.813***
(0.105) (0.160) (0.143)
Number of all children
1 	0.107 0.049 	0.262*
(0.103) (0.152) (0.143)
2 0.025 0.552** 	0.384*
(0.151) (0.236) (0.203)
3 0.105 1.102*** 	0.712**
(0.225) (0.353) (0.307)
4 	0.036 1.384** 	1.056**
(0.347) (0.549) (0.461)
5 	1.496** 	0.159 	2.481***
(0.644) (0.911) (0.930)
6 	1.314 0.310 	1.689
(1.056) (1.709) (1.630)
7 10.395 8.657
(618.331) (590.717)
Age2/100 	0.094*** 	0.144*** 	0.051*
(0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
Log of household income 	0.073 	0.087 	0.009
(0.063) (0.083) (0.099)
Number of years spent in
school
0.047 	0.005 0.090*
(0.040) (0.067) (0.050)
Employed full time 	0.013 	0.035 0.056
(0.076) (0.104) (0.114)
Disabled 0.322*** 0.074 0.534***
(0.108) (0.173) (0.143)
Single 0.205 0.425 0.129
(0.189) (0.299) (0.251)
Widowed 0.126 0.257 	0.158
(0.173) (0.229) (0.277)
Divorced 0.052 0.110 0.037
(0.181) (0.266) (0.259)
Separated 	0.053 	0.049 	0.090
(0.208) (0.299) (0.302)
East Germany 1.048 0.573 	10.752
(1.323) (1.947) (651.378)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood 	5,451.296 	2,490.613 	2,915.163
N 16,099 7,515 8,584
Note: Reference groups: married, not disabled, and West Germany. Left wing  1 if Social Democrats
and Free Democratic Party, 0  Christian Union and Christian Democrats.
*  10%; **  5%, ***  1%.
Source: German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP).
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some unusual biological causal chain from politics to the
later sex of offspring, or of selective abortion.10
A long-standing idea in Western society is that parents
influence the behavior and psychology of their children.
Following previous research, the analysis suggests the
reverse idea: that children shape their parents.11 This
paper, which could be seen as a study of endogenous
preferences, also sets out a formal framework with an
economic flavor. The model describes a world in which,
because of wage discrimination and different female
preferences over public goods, parents rationally tilt to
the left if they have daughters and to the right if they have
sons. Our analytical framework has this prediction.
Whether the model’s ideas are truly the right explanation
for the pattern we witness in the data seems an important
topic for further research.
10 Nor could we find longitudinal evidence in the data set that couples
stay together more when a son is born (Dahl & Moretti, 2005), so it is
apparently not a by-product of that.
11 In passing, a (tentative) conjecture can be made. It is that left-wing
individuals may be disproportionately people who come from extended
families where, over recent past generations, many females have been
born. Having many daughters pushes parents to the left; by the time the
children are old enough to acquire a political sense, their parents have
passed on some of those left-wing opinions to their sons and daughters; if
those children then go on to have daughters themselves, those left-wing
views, inherited from their parents, become strengthened among the sons
and daughters of the next generation. In this way, strings of daughters
through the generations might lead to left-wing families today. Strings of
sons would have the opposite effect. Whether there is empirical support
for this conjecture is an open question.
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APPENDIX
BHPS Data Description and Summary
Variables Description
All Males Females
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Vote left-wing parties Political party affiliation; 0  Conservatives (British right-
wing party)
0.651 (0.476) 0.648 (0.477) 0.653 (0.476)
1  Labour/Liberal Democrats (British left-wing parties)
Number of daughters Number of daughters 0.330 (0.640) 0.317 (0.630) 0.341 (0.648)
Number of children Number of children 0.704 (1.024) 0.681 (1.023) 0.725 (1.025)
Men Gender (male  1) 0.474 (0.499)
Age Age 48.460 (18.403) 47.634 (18.011) 49.205 (18.719)
Age2/100 Age2/100 26.870 (18.862) 25.933 (18.183) 27.716 (19.417)
Roman Catholic Religion: Roman Catholic 0.085 (0.279) 0.077 (0.266) 0.093 (0.290)
Church of England Religion: Church of England 0.263 (0.440) 0.221 (0.415) 0.300 (0.458)
Other religion Religion: Other religion 0.127 (0.333) 0.109 (0.312) 0.142 (0.350)
Self-employed Employment status, self-employed  1 0.071 (0.256) 0.108 (0.311) 0.037 (0.188)
Unemployed Employment status, unemployed  1 0.032 (0.176) 0.045 (0.208) 0.020 (0.140)
Retired Employment status, retired  1 0.250 (0.433) 0.232 (0.422) 0.266 (0.442)
Maternity leave Employment status, maternity leave  1 0.011 (0.103) 0.000 (0.016) 0.020 (0.141)
Housewife/looking after
home
Employment status, housewife/looking after home  1 0.071 (0.256) 0.007 (0.082) 0.129 (0.335)
Student Employment status, student  1 0.043 (0.202) 0.043 (0.204) 0.042 (0.200)
Disabled Employment status, disabled  1 0.035 (0.184) 0.041 (0.199) 0.030 (0.170)
Government training
scheme
Employment status, government training scheme  1 0.002 (0.041) 0.002 (0.048) 0.001 (0.033)
Other employment Employment status, other employment  1 0.003 (0.057) 0.003 (0.052) 0.004 (0.061)
Income (*1,000) Annual household income per capita, adjusted to CPI index
(in £1,000)
9.798 (8.076) 10.236 (8.098) 9.404 (8.036)
Married Marital status, married  1 0.588 (0.492) 0.626 (0.484) 0.554 (0.497)
Living as a couple Marital status, living with a partner  1 0.090 (0.286) 0.096 (0.294) 0.085 (0.279)
Widowed Marital status, widowed  1 0.094 (0.291) 0.044 (0.205) 0.138 (0.345)
Divorced Marital status, divorced  1 0.052 (0.222) 0.041 (0.199) 0.062 (0.241)
Separated Marital status, separated  1 0.014 (0.118) 0.012 (0.108) 0.016 (0.126)
Education: First degree First degree education, i.e., undergraduate levels 0.099 (0.299) 0.108 (0.311) 0.091 (0.288)
Education: Higher degree Higher degree education, i.e., postgraduate levels 0.025 (0.155) 0.029 (0.169) 0.020 (0.141)
Mental distress (GHQ-
12)
Measure of mental distress (GHQ-12) 1.883 (2.901) 1.599 (2.671) 2.141 (3.071)
Attitude questions
Cohabitation is all
right
Cohabitation is all right; 1  strongly agree, 5  strongly
disagree
2.241 (1.000) 2.217 (0.990) 2.262 (1.008)
Homosexuality is
wrong
Homosexuality is wrong; 1  strongly agree, 5  strongly
disagree
3.193 (1.206) 2.973 (1.238) 3.388 (1.142)
Husband should earn,
wife should stay at
home
Husband should earn, wife should stay at home; 1 
strongly agree, 5  strongly disagree
3.415 (1.125) 3.299 (1.117) 3.520 (1.122)
Children need father as
much as mother
Children need father as much as mother; 1  strongly
disagree
1.823 (0.762) 1.766 (0.698) 1.874 (0.812)
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